Undoing History by Ignoring It

Animus in consulendo liber 
("A mind unfettered in deliberation")

Now that the President (whose mind is quite evidently anything but unfettered in deliberation) has assured us that Iran has been militarily decimated, obliterated, and otherwise rendered harmless, and we are a mere two, maybe three, maybe less, maybe more, weeks (or months or hours or days) away from ending this “military” action because we just have some last minute decimating, obliterating, and otherwise rendering harmless things to do to decimate, obliterate, and otherwise render harmless any remaining Iranian military might that has not already been obliterated, decimated, and rendered harmless, not to mention we might have missed a school or two, I feel better already about the investment of $40 billion, so far, decimating, obliterating, and otherwise rendering harmless the threat Iran posed to the world according to the President.

And what has our adventure in the Middle East demonstrated? That most NATO countries (with whom we have shared intelligence since 1949) either didn’t read the memo, didn’t believe the memo, or are certain the memo was flawed and wouldn’t support our effort. They relied on obscure foundational elements of NATO coming to the aid of members under attack, not doing the attacking.

We should revisit our association. I mean, what have they done for us? So what if Putin almost needed to change his shorts when Ukraine considered applying for membership? Maybe that was just an act? Is that something we really need to consider?

Next up on the President’s MAGA juggernaut, NATO the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Not so fast, you might exclaim. Wasn’t NATO the genius of the very architects of our successful efforts in World War II? Is Mr. Trump really that much more geniusier than them? Perhaps we should examine the benefit and cost of NATO to the US. Not that we need them, of course, I mean we won World War II pretty much on our own despite that persistent historical analysis that the war was won with British Intelligence, Soviet Blood, and American Industrial Power.

But I digress, what does NATO do for us?

NATO Benefits (with sources of information, of course)

NATO delivers a substantial net benefit to U.S. security: the alliance’s direct financial cost to the United States is tiny compared with the strategic, military, and economic advantages it provides, which would otherwise require the U.S. to spend far more to achieve comparable security outcomes.

Direct costs are modest

– NATO’s “common funding” (headquarters, command structure, joint operations, infrastructure) totaled about €4.6 billion in 2024, or roughly $4.7 billion, of which the U.S. contributed about 16 %—approximately $753 million.[1]

– This represents less than 0.1 % of total U.S. military expenditures, and even when adding variable costs for military construction and joint exercises, the overall financial burden remains a small fraction of the U.S. defense budget.[1]

Benefits far outweigh these costs

– NATO provides the United States with guaranteed access to bases and overflight rights across Europe, which serve as “jumping‑off points” for operations in Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia.[2]

– The alliance enables intelligence fusion from 31 partner countries, giving the U.S. a fused product on Russian submarine activity, extremist movements, cyber threats, etc., that it could not replicate alone.[2] Denmark, when it is not fending off Trump’s advances on Greenland, routinely monitors Russian submarine activity and shares it with us, at least for the moment.

– Standardization agreements ensure interoperability (e.g., U.S. F‑35s can refuel and re‑arm at allied bases using the same fuel nozzles, munitions, and spare parts), a logistical advantage no other coalition matches.[2]

– NATO’s nuclear‑sharing arrangements deter proliferation by providing a credible U.S. nuclear umbrella in Europe, reducing the likelihood that allies would develop independent arsenals.[2]

– The Belfer Center estimates that, without NATO, the United States would need to increase its defense budget by **$100 billion–$200 billion annually** to fill the security vacuum left by a fragmented Europe.[2]

– In practical terms, NATO delivers “bargain rates,” with only about **5 % of U.S. defense spending** directed toward Europe and the alliance, while granting broad military, economic, and political benefits.[3]

Overall assessment

Because the direct financial contribution is under $1 billion per year—less than 0.1 % of the U.S. defense budget—while the alliance saves the United States an estimated $100 billion–$200 billion each year in avoided duplication of capabilities, provides critical basing, intelligence, interoperability, and non‑proliferation benefits, the net benefit of NATO to U.S. security is strongly positive. The United States gains far more than it pays, making NATO a cost‑effective force multiplier for American national security.

Author Note: The following is an in-depth analysis I’ve been researching for some time. It is wonky, dry, and based on complex and continuously changing legal decisions and Congressional actions. It is fundamental to understanding the complexities involved, but not exciting reading. I’ll leave it to you to decide if you need to read it.

Can the President Just Leave NATO?

Not without Congressional approval, but there will be litigation involved since the courts have not ruled on the constitutionality of the current law. Recognizing the importance of our NATO alliance, and trying to remove it from momentary political concerns, Congress placed restrictions on the President’s ability to simply walk away from NATO.

What Congress did

In December 2023, Congress passed — and President Joe Biden signed into law — the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act.
Section 1250A of that law explicitly prohibits the president from suspending, terminating, denouncing, or withdrawing the United States from NATO unless one of two conditions is met:
1. Approval by two‑thirds of the Senate, or
2. Authorization through an Act of Congress [congress.gov], [thehill.com]

What the provision says (in substance)

It treats withdrawal from NATO similarly to entering a treaty, requiring the same Senate supermajority used for treaty ratification.
It also bars the use of federal funds to carry out a NATO withdrawal unless Congress has approved it, giving the restriction real enforcement teeth [legalclarity.org], [usnews.com]

Where it came from

The provision was bipartisan, spearheaded by Sen. Tim Kaine (D‑VA) and then‑Sen. Marco Rubio (R‑FL).
It was adopted specifically in response to concerns that a future president might attempt to leave NATO without congressional involvement [thehill.com], [kaine.senate.gov]

Is it settled law?

Statutorily, yes — the restriction is currently federal law.
Constitutionally, the issue is not fully settled:
- The Constitution is silent on treaty withdrawal.
- A 2020 Justice Department opinion claimed presidents have exclusive withdrawal authority.
- However, a 2026 Congressional Research Service report explains that Section 1250A creates a direct legal conflict that courts may now be more willing to review if a president attempts unilateral withdrawal [congress.gov]

Bottom line

Congress has, in fact, added a binding provision to the defense authorization bill that bars a president from withdrawing from NATO on their own. Whether a president could successfully defy it would likely be decided by courts — but as written, the law clearly requires congressional approval.

Below is a clear, legally grounded walk‑through of what would likely happen if a president tried to withdraw from NATO anyway, despite Section 1250A of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). I’ll separate what the law explicitly provides from how events would probably unfold in practice, and I’ll flag where uncertainty remains.

This issue, as with most issues, is complex and nuanced. It does not lend itself to simple social media memes or half-baked concepts of absolute Presidential power in national defense matters.

1. The triggering act: presidential notice of withdrawal

What the president would do

Under Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty, a member withdraws by giving formal notice to the U.S. government (as treaty depository), with withdrawal taking effect one year later. A president could attempt to:

Issue a diplomatic notice of denunciation, and/or
Direct executive agencies to begin withdrawal preparations.

Why this immediately conflicts with U.S. law

Section 1250A of the FY2024 NDAA expressly prohibits the president from:

“suspending, terminating, denouncing, or withdrawing” the U.S. from NATO without either:
- Two‑thirds Senate approval, or
- An Act of Congress [congress.gov]

So the moment the president acts without congressional approval, they are acting in direct violation of a federal statute.

2. Immediate legal effect inside the U.S. government

The withdrawal is not automatically valid domestically

Even if the president issues notice internationally:

Federal law still binds executive agencies
The NDAA also bars the use of appropriated funds to support or implement a NATO withdrawal [legalclarity.org], [usnews.com]

This creates a practical choke point:

State Department, Defense Department, and Treasury officials would face a choice between:
- Following a presidential directive, or
- Complying with federal law and refusing to act

That conflict alone could stall implementation before courts ever get involved.

3. Congress’s immediate responses (political branch remedies)

Congress has several explicit, non‑judicial tools available, all grounded in existing law:

A. Funding enforcement

Because the statute bars spending on withdrawal:

Congress could direct GAO or inspectors general to investigate violations
Agencies that spend money to implement withdrawal risk illegal expenditure findings [legalclarity.org]

B. Legislative escalation

Congress could:

Pass clarifying legislation reaffirming the prohibition
Condition or restrict executive branch authorities even further
Use oversight hearings to document noncompliance

None of these require courts — and historically, Congress often prefers these tools first.

4. The judicial question: can anyone sue?

This is the most uncertain part, and it’s where the issue becomes constitutionally interesting.

Standing problems

Courts have historically dismissed treaty‑withdrawal disputes as “political questions” (e.g., Goldwater v. Carter). However, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) explains that Section 1250A materially changes the analysis:

Congress has now clearly asserted statutory authority
Courts may be more willing to hear a case when a president violates an explicit law [congress.gov]

Still, who has standing is unclear:

Individual members of Congress likely lack standing
Congress as an institution might sue, but only if both chambers authorize it
States, contractors, or service members affected by withdrawal might attempt litigation, but success is uncertain [politico.com]

Bottom line: litigation is possible, but not guaranteed.

5. If a court does hear the case

If a court reaches the merits, it faces a direct constitutional conflict:

The president’s argument

The Constitution is silent on treaty withdrawal
Executive branch legal opinions (notably a 2020 OLC memo) claim the president has exclusive withdrawal authority

Congress’s argument

Congress has explicit powers over:
- Treaties (via Senate consent)
- Foreign commerce
- Military funding
Section 1250A lawfully conditions withdrawal on legislative approval
The president is violating a valid statute

CRS notes that modern Supreme Court doctrine may be less deferential than in past decades when a president ignores a clear statutory command. [congress.gov]

6. What happens internationally during the dispute?

Even if litigation is pending:

NATO allies would receive conflicting signals
Many would likely treat the withdrawal as legally uncertain
Because withdrawal takes one year, allies would almost certainly wait for:
- U.S. court rulings, or
- Congressional resolution

This delay substantially weakens any unilateral attempt.

7. Likely end states (ranked by probability)

Based on current law and expert analysis:

Withdrawal stalls due to funding restrictions and agency resistance
Congress forces compliance through appropriations and oversight
Courts intervene and enjoin the withdrawal
Constitutional showdown if a president persists despite all constraints
Successful unilateral withdrawal — legally possible, but the least likely outcome

As multiple analysts have noted, the law is “not airtight,” but it raises the cost and difficulty of withdrawal enormously. [lawfaremedia.org], [politico.com]

Bottom line

If a president tried to withdraw from NATO unilaterally:

They would immediately violate federal law
Implementation would likely be blocked internally
Congress would have powerful enforcement tools
Courts might intervene — and are more likely to do so than in the past
The process would almost certainly take longer than the one‑year treaty timeline

Below is a concrete, legally grounded explanation of what Congress could change or add to make the NATO‑withdrawal restriction much harder for a president to defy, building directly on weaknesses that experts, CRS, and courts have already identified.

I’ll organize this by problem → fix, so you can see exactly what each change would accomplish.

1. Problem: Unclear who can sue → Fix: Explicit litigation authorization

The weakness today

Section 1250A clearly prohibits unilateral withdrawal, but it does not explicitly authorize anyone to enforce it in court. Courts often dismiss separation‑of‑powers cases for lack of standing or as “political questions”. [congress.gov], [politico.com]

What Congress could add

Congress could pass a statute that:

Explicitly grants standing to:
- Congress as an institution (via a joint resolution), and/or
- Designated committees (e.g., Senate Foreign Relations, House Armed Services)
Pre‑authorizes expedited judicial review in federal court

Why this matters

Courts are far more likely to hear cases when Congress has clearly authorized litigation
This directly addresses the biggest enforcement gap identified by CRS and constitutional scholars [congress.gov], [lawfaremedia.org]

Effect: Converts a “maybe justiciable” dispute into a strong candidate for immediate court review.

2. Problem: President might argue exclusive constitutional authority → Fix: Findings + severability

The weakness today

Presidents rely on past executive branch legal opinions claiming treaty withdrawal is an exclusive executive power. Courts sometimes defer when Congress’s intent is unclear.

What Congress could add

Congress could:

Include detailed legislative findings stating:
- Treaty withdrawal affecting collective defense and appropriations is a shared power
- Section 1250A is grounded in Congress’s Article I powers (funding, military regulation, treaties)
Add a severability clause ensuring the rest of the statute survives even if one provision is struck down

Why this matters

Courts use congressional findings to assess constitutionality
This strengthens Congress’s position if the statute is challenged

Effect: Raises the bar for any court to side with unilateral executive authority.

3. Problem: Executive agencies might quietly comply → Fix: Personal legal consequences

The weakness today

Even with a funding ban, agencies might still follow presidential directives, betting enforcement will be slow or political.

What Congress could add

Congress could:

Explicitly state that any officer who implements an unauthorized withdrawal:
- Violates the Anti‑Deficiency Act
- Is subject to administrative discipline or removal
Require mandatory reporting to Congress for any action related to NATO withdrawal

Why this matters

Civil servants are legally bound to follow statutes
Personal liability changes behavior immediately

Effect: Makes bureaucratic compliance with an illegal withdrawal extremely unlikely.

4. Problem: Withdrawal notice might still be sent internationally → Fix: Domestic legal nullification

The weakness today

A president might argue that international notice is effective even if illegal domestically.

What Congress could add

Congress could enact language stating:

Any NATO withdrawal notice issued without congressional approval has no legal effect under U.S. law
The Secretary of State must certify congressional authorization before transmitting or recognizing any withdrawal notice

Why this matters

Courts often distinguish between domestic legality and international acts
This would make the act of sending notice itself unlawful

Effect: Prevents the president from even starting the one‑year treaty clock.

5. Problem: Slow courts → Fix: Automatic injunction mechanism

The weakness today

Even if litigation occurs, withdrawal might proceed during delays.

What Congress could add

Congress could mandate that:

Any unauthorized withdrawal attempt triggers an automatic statutory stay
Courts must apply expedited timelines for review

This is similar to how Congress structures election law and national security cases.

Why this matters

Prevents “withdraw now, litigate later” strategies

Effect: Freezes the process immediately.

6. Problem: Future repeal risk → Fix: Supermajority lock‑in

The weakness today

A future Congress could repeal Section 1250A by simple majority.

What Congress could add

While Congress cannot legally bind future Congresses completely, it could:

Require a supermajority vote to authorize NATO withdrawal
Tie withdrawal authorization to treaty‑level procedures permanently

Why this matters

Raises political and procedural costs
Signals long‑term institutional commitment to allies and courts

Effect: Makes reversal politically and procedurally difficult.

Summary Table: How Congress could harden the law

Vulnerability	Fix	Impact
No clear plaintiff	Authorize lawsuits	Courts must hear cases
Executive power claims	Findings + severability	Stronger constitutional footing
Agency compliance	Personal liability	Immediate internal resistance
Treaty notice loophole	Nullify unauthorized notice	Stops withdrawal clock
Litigation delay	Automatic stay	Prevents fait accompli
Easy repeal	Supermajority requirement	Long‑term durability