Routes of Involvement: Iran

By engaging in basic research into the history of U.S. interventionist strategies in Iran and elsewhere, one can develop a fairly realistic, high-potential scenario of the likely results of our latest intervention. One doesn’t have to sit in the Cabinet room to understand what is happening or how it came about. This administration has been telegraphing this since their first term.

Now no one questions the absolutely critical need to prevent a theocracy-based apocalyptic government embracing dark ages beliefs in gods, holy books, and divine selection from possessing nuclear weapons. No nation that believes in Armageddon can be allowed to control the means to bring it about.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, both military and diplomatic means have been employed to do so. They have been largely successful. The best intelligence information, which this administration itself touts, is that the nuclear program suffered severe setbacks (decimated, in their words), preventing Iran from having these weapons during the last air campaign.

Yet, they have now abandoned negotiations—Trump tore up the agreements reached with Iran under Obama and let lapse the START agreements with Russia—in favor of military force. In the history of the world, military force alone never produced lasting peace.

We once favored making incremental efforts to move the hands of the nuclear clock away from midnight, but now we have allowed it to creep ever closer.

Iran would struggle to survive a sustained military campaign from the U.S. and Israel, but it will not go quietly. To believe anything else is foolish and dangerous.

We should, at a minimum, understand what has happened in the past as a guide for crafting future policies. In Iran, there is a rich history of U.S. intervention, initially at the insistence of the British to protect their oil industry from the policy of the elected prime minister to nationalize it. This latest intervention in Iran needs to be measured against this history, and our actions must be guided by understanding the consequences in light of the current situation.

David Boise, the attorney who represented Al Gore in Bush Vs, Gore and collaborated with former solicitor general Ted Olson in opposing California’s Proposition 8 restrictions on same sex marriage, and a staunch Democrat, wrote an intriguing Op-ed in the Wall Street Journal called Partisanship on Iran Is Dangerous for America . (https://www.wsj.com/opinion/partisanship-on-iran-is-dangerous-for-america-c8b69387 you can get a free account to read the article.)

Boise points out the danger of Iran to the U.S. and the world, and argues we have often given the benefit of the doubt to Presidents when it comes to military decisions such as these, and should do so in this case, Citing the unpopular decision of Truman to go to war in Korea (which he chose not to run for re-election because of the public attitude) as an example.

I would agree we should be able to give a president, any president, the benefit of the doubt, regardless of political differences during such times. But this is not any president. Truman forged a consensus with many other countries to stop the North Korean/Chinese invasion of South Korea. Mr. Trump and Israel chose to act unilaterally, then solicit support when the Iranians resorted to the only viable tactic available to them in the face of overwhelming American and Israeli military force, shutting down the Strait of Hormuz.

It is this track record of this administration’s lack of planning and foresight that spawns our opposition.

I find it hard to believe that the U.S. military didn’t foresee such a scenario and present it to Secretary Hesgeth and the President. Based on their reaction since the beginning of the action, one has to assume they discounted it. This underscores their lack of competence.

First, it was blowing up alleged drug boats from South America, then that stopped, but the boats haven’t. Then it was removing Maduro and recognizing essentially the same government he once led. And now it is Iran,

Our dissent and opposition to this policy will not “force” Trump to end the action before he completes any legitimate goal, his own limited attention span, fundamental lack of geopolitical understanding, and inability to carry out any long-term strategy will do that.

He’s like a kid at Christmas, running from present to present, drawn away from one by the next shiny object. Soon, all that will remain are scattered pieces of each mixed together in worse chaos.

The problem here is not the lack of support for the president of the United States in a difficult and controversial foreign policy decision. The problem here is the demonstrated lack of competence by this president to act effectively. During Mr. Trump’s first term, adults were present in the room. That is no longer the case.

Mr. Boise says this.

If we believe that Iran presents a serious threat, we need to support the president on this issue. There’s plenty to disagree with him about, and we don’t need to like or admire him. But on Iran we should be on common ground. Not primarily because we want to reduce partisanship in foreign affairs—although that is conceivable. Not because the voters will reward us for a more measured response—although I hope they will. But because it is the right thing to do for our country, our children and the Democrat who will succeed Mr. Trump as president.

U.S. involvement in Iran has been shaped by Cold War strategy, energy security, and regional stability concerns. The 1953 coup against Iran’s elected prime minister remains a defining event, contributing to long‑term mistrust and shaping Iran’s authoritarian trajectory. Prospects for a return to democratic governance exist but face significant structural and geopolitical constraints.

Key Phases of U.S. Involvement

1953 Coup and the Shah (1953–1979)
In 1953, the United States and United Kingdom supported the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh after he nationalized Iran’s oil industry. The CIA‑backed operation (Operation Ajax) restored Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi with expanded powers, prioritizing Western oil interests and Cold War containment over Iran’s democratic institutions. The Shah’s subsequent authoritarian rule, backed by U.S. military and economic aid, suppressed political opposition and fueled domestic resentment.

Islamic Revolution and Estrangement (1979–2000s)
The 1979 Iranian Revolution overthrew the Shah and established an Islamic Republic. Memories of the 1953 coup contributed to deep suspicion of U.S. intentions, crystallized during the U.S. embassy hostage crisis. Since then, relations have oscillated between limited engagement and confrontation, influenced by regional conflicts and nuclear concerns.

Contemporary Period (2000s–Present)
U.S. policy has alternated between sanctions, diplomacy, and deterrence. While internal Iranian politics remain constrained by unelected institutions, periodic protests and reform movements indicate enduring public demand for accountability and representation.

Prospects for a Return to Democratic Governance

Constraints

Institutional barriers: Iran’s political system grants ultimate authority to unelected bodies, limiting electoral power.
Security apparatus: State security forces have historically suppressed reform movements.
External pressure: Sanctions and regional tensions often strengthen hardliners who oppose political liberalization.

Opportunities

Popular legitimacy gap: Public dissatisfaction with economic conditions and governance persists.
Historical precedent: Iran has a strong constitutional and parliamentary tradition predating 1953.
Generational change: Younger Iranians show higher support for political pluralism and civil rights.

Policy Implications

Avoid regime‑change tactics: Historical experience shows external intervention undermines democratic legitimacy.
Support civil society indirectly: Educational, cultural, and informational engagement can strengthen long‑term democratic capacity without validating hardliner narratives.
Link diplomacy to governance outcomes cautiously: Engagement that reduces external threat perceptions may widen space for internal reform over time.

The potential exists for the U.S. and other nations to encourage, incubate, and empower internal change. The Iranian people, like any other, seek freedom. But killing young children at a school, unintentional or not, only creates more anger, mistrust, and resistance to U.S. efforts.

Killing their children does not indicate altruistic intentions on our part. What would your reaction be to such an act here?.

Conclusion

A return to democratically elected governance in Iran is possible but unlikely in the near term without internal political change. U.S. policy that acknowledges historical grievances—especially the legacy of 1953—while emphasizing restraint and long‑term engagement offers the best chance of supporting democratic evolution without repeating past mistakes.